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Assuming that an adversary cannot effect such channels is
no longer realistic, as demonstrated by recent attacks lever-
aging malware to target the user interface, as well as more
established social engineering attacks. Notably the Tap ‘n
Ghost attack [33], which specifically targets Bluetooth devices,
refutes the idea that user communications should be ignored
in protocol analysis. As a result, it is critical to analyze the
protocols in their entirety, accounting for both user interaction
and device-to-device communication – namely, the cyborg
protocol.
Leading authenticated key exchange (AKE) models do not
capture user-to-device (UtD) attacks due to the sole focus
on device-to-device (DtD) communications. However user-
oriented attacks arise precisely from adversarial control of the
UtD channel, or from a combination of control on UtD and
DtD channels. While models capturing the UtD channel in the
analysis of authentication protocols have emerged [18], [23],
there has been a lack of such modeling for key exchange until
now despite the standarized use of such protocols in practice.
This is in stark contrast to the widespread implementation
and standardization of AKE protocols employing the UtD
channel [10], [25].
We model adversarial abilities against key exchange on
what is normally the OOB channel. As noted before, Tap ’n
Ghost is one attack which focuses heavily on vulnerabilities
in the (previously assumed to be perfect) OOB channel. The
attack is notable as it is a two-pronged assault on a user
interface (without actively attacking device memory itself).
The attacker first executes a Tag-based Adaptive Ploy, which
forces a pop-up to display on a user’s device, and then
activates a Ghost Touch Generator, which spoofs touches
on unwanted areas of the screen, to force pairing with a
corrupted device. Thus, the attack requires adversarial ability
to create messages to be sent to a user from a device, and
adversarial ability to modify communications back from the
user to the device (see Figure 1). We reference the Tap n’
Ghost attack as an illustrative example throughout, but it
is not the only attack leveraging the UtD communication
channel. Touchloggers [12], [16], the StrandHogg vulnerability
[24], social engineering, and shoulder-surfing attacks also fall
into this category. All such attack vectors are systematically
accounted for in our CYBORG model.
Bluetooth’s Passkey Entry [10] generates and shares a
random value (a passkey) via the user to effectively achieve
Abstract—In this paper, we computationally analyze Passkey 
Entry in its entirety as a cryptographic authenticated key 
exchange (AKE) – including user-protocol interactions that are 
typically ignored as out-of-band. To achieve this, we model the 
user-to-device channels, as well as the typical device-to-device 
channel, and adversarial control scenarios in both cases. In 
particular, we separately capture adversarial control of device 
displays on the initiating and responding devices as well as 
adversarial control of user input mechanisms using what we 
call a CYBORG model. The CYBORG model enables realistic 
real-world security analysis in light of published attacks on 
user-mediated protocols such as Bluetooth that leverage malware 
and device displays. In light of this, we show that all versions 
of Passkey Entry fail to provide security in our model. Finally, 
we demonstrate how slight modifications to the protocol would 
allow it to achieve stronger security guarantees for all current 
variants of passkey generation, as well as a newly proposed 
twofold mode of generation we term Dual Passkey Entry. 
These proof-of-concept modifications point to improved design 
approaches for user-mediated protocols. Finally, this work points 
to categories of vulnerabilities, based on compromise type, that 
could be exploited in Bluetooth Passkey Entry.
Keywords: Bluetooth · Authenticated Key Exchange · CYBORG 
Protocols · Secure Connections · Secure Simple Pairing · Passkey 
Entry · Computational Analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
In traditional cryptographic protocols, user authentication is 
achieved via a trusted third party such as a certificate authority. 
However, in some settings, such as the Internet of Things 
(IoT), a reliable connection to such an authority cannot be 
guaranteed, and in some lightweight cases certificates cannot 
be used or reliably updated. Such protocols instead rely on 
the human user to affirm the identities of communicating 
parties via an out-of-band (OOB) channel, usually via the 
user inputting a PIN code or password. Among these is the 
Bluetooth protocol [10]. Naturally, if we assume a perfectly 
secure OOB channel, analysis of the direct device-to-device 
communication is simplified, and consequently the approach 
was sensible in the earlier days of protocol design and analysis.
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entity authentication via the user mediation. Passkey Entry was
primarily designed for pairing when at least one device has
a keyboard but not a numerical display, such as a Bluetooth
keyboard attempting to pair with a modern computer. In that
case, a user could input a computer-displayed passkey into
the keyboard for pairing. However, recently Passkey Entry has
seen additional application when both devices have numerical
keyboard and display capability, such as the manual pairing
method between an Apple Watch and iPhone [3]. Bluetooth
itself has enjoyed a long history of design advances [9],
[36] and analysis [14], [15], [32], [41], as well as published
attacks [1], [2], [8], [22], [31], [33]. The Secure Simple
Pairing mechanism, first published in Bluetooth v2.1 and
updated to Secure Connections in v4.2, allowed for flexibility
by providing four methods of authenticated key exchange
dependent on device input/output (IO) capabilities: Just Works,
Numeric Comparison, Out-of-Band, and Passkey Entry. Of
these, Numeric Comparison and Passkey Entry both rely on
the user playing an active role in an authenticated key ex-
change (AKE). While Numeric Comparison has been analyzed
computationally [32], [41], Passkey Entry has until now not
received a detailed analysis. This raises the question, as a
cyborg protocol, is Bluetooth Passkey Entry secure and, if so,
under what conditions?
Fig. 1. Tap ‘n Ghost. Adversary uses a Tag-based Adaptive Ploy to display
a message from device A to the user requesting to pair to a malicious device
Eve. When the user denies this request, a Ghost Touch Generator corrupts the
input and forces acceptance by device A. These actions map to a ShowUser
query and ControlUser query, respectively, in the CYBORG model.
We address this question, presenting a computational anal-
ysis of Bluetooth Basic Rate / Extended Data Rate (BR/EDR)
versions 2.1–5.2 Passkey Entry (henceforth abbeviated Passkey
Entry). The analysis applies to Passkey Entry under either
the Secure Simple Pairing or Secure Connections Bluetooth
security framework, and is based on transcript matching as
part of entity authentication. To achieve this, we first present
a computational CYBORG AKE model, capturing adver-
saries capable of exploiting user-to-device transmissions. Our
CYBORG model systematically covers all combinations of
adversarial ability to create and modify messages from the
device to the user and vice versa. As a result, our analysis not
only demonstrates potential insecurities in Passkey Entry, but
clarifies under which conditions it is secure.
A. Attacking User-to-Device Communications.
Social engineering and shoulder-surfing are well-accepted
techniques for targeting user-device communication, but recent
attacks on the UtD channel of cyborg-style protocols extend
well beyond these and lead us to a baseline classification
of attack vectors. For example, Touchloggers [12] attempt to
mimic the role of keyloggers by logging a user’s presses on a
screen and then predicting the buttons that were pressed. The
StrandHogg vulnerability [24] functions by disguising malware
as legitimate apps for the user to interact with and unknowingly
allow a hacker to compromise their device. Summarizing
known attacks, we have the following four baseline attack
vectors over the UtD channel: compromise of the commu-
nication channel from the initiating device to the user (type
iu), the responding device to the user (type ru), the user to
the initiating device (type ui), and the user to the responding
device (type ur). We illustrate these attacks in Fig. 2. We use
these classifications to model adversarial capabilities by allow-
ing for combinations of adversarial ShowUser and ControlUser

























Fig. 2. Visual depiction of the baseline four possibilities of user compromise
(CompUser-freshness) where the adversary is allowed to corrupt only one
direction of the user-to-device channel at a time, denoted by a red dashed
line. We use the terms CompUser[iu], CompUser[ru], CompUser[ui], and
CompUser[ur] to describe the attack scenarios represented by Figure 2a,
Figure 2b, Figure 2c, and Figure 2d respectively.
For an example, consider how these combinations capture
the Tap n’ Ghost attack: This attack involves compromising
communications between a single device and the user; both
from the device to the user and from the user to the same
device. Thus, we can model this attack as a simultaneous
combination of either both a type iu and type ui compromise
(CompUser[iu,ui]), if the initiating device is being targeted, or
a type ru and type ur compromise (CompUser[ru,ur]), if the
responding device is being targeted. Initiator and responder
roles become important depending on the protocol and attack,
such as in Initiator-Generated Passkey Entry where only the
initiator displays a string to the user. In our model, this
correlates to both a ShowUser query and a ControlUser query,
as shown in Figure 1.
We allow for 16 different security frameworks (plus one to
model the null case where the adversary gains no additional
capabilities on the UtD channel) based on the possible com-
binations of the four baseline types {iu, ru, ui, ur} in Fig. 2.
All of these combinations are distinct due to the various forms
that cyborg protocols may take. For example, Passkey Entry
has three modes based on how the passkey is generated: by the
initiating device, responding device, or the user. The effects
of adversary action against a device display depends on the
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initiator/responder role of the device in question. Allowing for
all possible combinations therefore enables analysis to not only
adapt itself based on the protocol being investigated, but also
pinpoint the exact circumstances under which a protocol fails
to maintain security. This is especially useful information for
those looking to assess where to devote security resources. If
a protocol provides weak security against attacks afflicting the
initiator device, for example, but is resistant to attacks against
a responder device, then developers and system administrators
can plan and make design choices accordingly to limit vul-
nerability. Thus, analysis in our model can assist in limiting
zero-day attacks against devices employing cyborg protocols.
B. Previous Work on Passkey Entry.
Passkey Entry is the primary version of Bluetooth authen-
ticated key exchange employed when two devices want to pair
and at least one does not have display capability [10]. In-
formally, it functions by having two devices exchange/receive
a passkey for a user-to-device channel and proceed to com-
mit to each bit of said passkey sequentially. This sequential
construction, first proposed in [27], was devised to prevent
offline dictionary attacks [39], such as those that plague legacy
versions of Bluetooth authenticated key exchange.
Although Passkey Entry complicates an offline dictionary
attack by committing to each bit of the passkey sequentially,
it is more susceptible to other types of eavesdropping attacks
[31]. Other investigations into the security of Passkey Entry
have been largely ad-hoc [4], [31], [40], involving exploits
in the re-use of random values across multiple executions of
the protocol. A notable attack applicable to Passkey Entry
outside of this construction is the Fixed Coordinate Invalid
Curve Attack [8], which exploits devices not verifying the y-
coordinate of a received Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)
public key to insert an erroneous value and trivially compute
the agreed upon DH key. Research has been conducted on the
use of short, user-authenticated strings (i.e. a passkey no more
than 20 bits long) for the authentication of a Diffie-Hellman
key [21], [30], [42], which demonstrated that security of such
schemes is achievable in certain models and mainly dependent
on the length of the passkey.
Other published attacks against Bluetooth pairing that use
auxiliary mechanisms to compromise device communications
include the BT–Niño–MITM attack [22], Bluetooth Imperson-
ation AttackS (BIAS) [1], and Key Negotiation of Bluetooth
(KNOB) [2]. BT–Niño–MITM exploits the un-authenticated
exchange of IO capabilities to force a downgrade to Just
Works for pairing, a protocol which Bluetooth acknowledges
provides no protection against active adversaries [10]. Al-
though BT–Niño–MITM was originally published in regards
to Bluetooth BR/EDR v2.1-3, the attack remains current and
recommendations to alleviate this vulnerability [22] include
setting mandatory pairing methods for devices and displaying
messages to the user confirming the pairing method desired.
BIAS and KNOB both affect the Bluetooth BR/EDR v2.1-
5.0 standardization and apply strictly to resumption after
successful pairing.
The above attacks are relevant when discussing the holistic
security of Bluetooth, yet these attacks do not address the
underlying security achieved by Passkey Entry. While it is
possible to require ephemeral passkeys in keeping with Blue-
tooth’s recommendation, and verification of the y-coordinate of
the ECDH public key, these changes alone do not provide guar-
antees of security, as a systematic analysis of Passkey Entry is
lacking. Furthermore, the above mentioned analyses all treat
user-to-device communications as secure OOB channels and
disallow adversary actions on such channels – an assumption
falsified by attacks like Tap ‘n Ghost, Touchloggers, etc.
C. Modeling User-mediated Protocols.
Including user interaction in analysis saw early work in the
symbolic setting, including an analysis of Bluetooth Numeric
Comparison [15]. The user as a central component of the
model was first introduced in the symbolic setting under the
concept of ceremonies [20]. Ceremonies capture the intuition
that there is no out-of-band communication, whether through
the user, network, or other devices; all possible network
communications, user to device interaction, displays, etc., can
affect security. These ideas were later used for a second
analysis of Numeric Comparison, which expanded adversarial
capabilities over the user-to-device channel to include Eaves-
drop and Spoof [14].
Using the user-to-device channel to exchange short, authen-
ticated passkeys between devices saw security investigation
under a computational setting by Peyrin and Vaudenay [37].
Although the user-to-device channel was considered as a
secure OOB channel outside of adversarial attack abilities
in that research, the user was included as an active partic-
ipant with the ability to pick random numbers or compare
values. Vaudenay [42] extended these modeling choices in
a subsequent investigation of user-mediated protocols using
passkeys where the adversary was allowed to delete, replay,
or delay messages on the OOB channel, but not modify or
create them. Thus, such modeling would not capture attacks
such as Tap n’ Ghost, as message modification is out-of-
scope and channels. Notably, the user-device channels were
also treated in a combined way, vs. allowing separate action
on each device. Vaudenay’s adversarial construction was also
mirrored in Laur and Nyberg’s security analysis of the MANA
IV protocol, a precursor to Numeric Comparison [30]. We
expand on these initial analyses by also giving the adversary
the capability to modify and create user-to-device messages
dependent on the CYBORG security framework in use, as
well as systematically considering separate adversarial action
for the variants of the user-to-device channel.
Recent research in the computational setting [18], [23]
incorporates user–device interaction in the analysis of au-
thentication protocols. The 3-Party Possession User Mediated
Authentication (3-PUMA) model, presented in [23], provided a
computational model to capture communications sent over both
the device-to-device channel and the user-to-device channels.
That model was later adapted to allow for the adversarial
queries ShowUser and ControlUser [18] and used to analyze
entity authentication in Signal under the Mediated Epoch
Three-Party Authentication (META) computational model.
These queries capture adversarial ability to show erroneous
information to the user (e.g. via malware on the device) as well
as input erroneous information from the user (e.g. via modeling
social engineering). These models form the foundation for our
development of the CYBORG model.
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k UncUser X X X X X X X∗
CompUser[iu] X X X X X
∗ X∗ X∗
CompUser[ru] X X X X
∗ X X∗ X∗
CompUser[ui] X X X X
∗ X X X∗
CompUser[ur] X X X X X
∗ X X∗
CompUser[iu,ru] X X X X X X
∗ X∗
CompUser[iu,ur] X X X X X
∗ X X∗
CompUser[ru,ui] X X X X
∗ X X X∗
CompUser[iu,ui] X X X X X X X
∗
CompUser[ru,ur] X X X X X X X
∗
CompUser[iu,ru,ui,ur] X X X X X X X
TABLE I. TABLE DEPICTING LEVELS OF CYBORG SECURITY IN THE UNCOMPROMISED (UncUser) AND COMPROMISED USER (CompUser[x])
SETTINGS ACHIEVED BY THE PASSKEY ENTRY PROTOCOL (SECTION IV), AS WELL AS SECURE HASH MODIFICATION (SHM) PASSKEY ENTRY AND DUAL
PASSKEY ENTRY (SECTION VI). DUAL PASSKEY ENTRY IS PROVABLY SECURE UNDER ALL VARIANTS OF THE CYBORG SECURITY MODEL
(SECTION III). ALL OTHER VERSIONS OF PASSKEY ENTRY WERE FOUND TO BE INSECURE UNDER THE DEFINITIONS NOT DEPICTED. X DEPICTS PROVEN
SECURE IN THIS WORK, X∗ DEPICTS PROVABLY SECURE BY IMPLICATION, AND X DEPICTS INSECURE.
While previous work focused on authentication protocols,
we introduce a framework for the analysis of cyborg key
exchange. Our key exchange framework is in keeping with
other prominent standard AKE models [7], [13], [26], [29]
where matching participant transcripts are required. We further
add user modeling components from [18], [23]. Additionally,
we extend earlier models for finer-grained analysis of the
user-to/from-device channel security for individual devices and
sessions, by separating out specific adversarial categories as
shown in Figure 2.
Table I summarizes our results, showing the security
of the original Passkey Entry protocol in our model under
all protocol variants (Initiator-Generated Passkey, Responder-
Generated Passkey, and User-Generated Passkey) and all ad-
versarial channel control variants (rows). Furthermore, the
security of Bluetooth under our two proposed protocol mod-
ification variants is also shown (columns 4-7). While Dual
Passkey Entry with Secure Hash Modification is the strongest
protocol in our model, it also requires the most changes to
the underlying protocol, and may not be feasible if both
devices do not possess both input and output capabilities. Thus
we demonstrate how even a minor change to the protocol
can enable Passkey Entry to provide some security under a
CYBORG adversary (columns 4-6).
D. Contributions
We build on research of user-mediated protocols with an
analysis of Passkey Entry, and summarize our results in Table I.
Specifically,
• we provide the first security framework in computational
analysis for cyborg AKEs supporting adversarial modifi-
cation and creation of user-to-device messages, where the
user is an active participant in protocol execution.
• we provide the first systematic separation of all variants
of adversarial capabilities against user-to-device channels.
• we conduct the first computational analysis of Passkey
Entry for Bluetooth BR/EDR, under either Secure Sim-
ple Pairing or Secure Connections. This analysis com-
prehensively covers all protocol variants, where the
passkey is initiator-generated, responder-generated, or
user-generated.
• we show that basic protocol modifications can improve
the security of Passkey Entry in the CYBORG model,
even to the point of full CYBORG security. This high-
lights the usability of the model, as well as the fine-
grained clarity it provides to the conditions of protocol
security.
The paper organization proceeds as follows: Section II
introduces the Bluetooth Passkey Entry protocol per specifi-
cation. The CYBORG model, including freshness conditions
to capture various adversarial capabilities, is introduced in
Section III. In Section IV we analyze all variants of Passkey
Entry in the CYBORG model. Finally, in Section V we present
two modifications of Passkey Entry, requiring different degrees
of protocol changes and show, in Section VI the corresponding
security analyses of the modified variants.
II. PASSKEY ENTRY PROTOCOL
In this section we present the Passkey Entry protocol
adapted to fit within below mathematical definitions and a
diagram for reference in Figure 3.
A. Relevant Variables
Variables used in Passkey Entry are described as follows:
• A ∈ {0, 1}48: The Bluetooth device address / identity of
device of A.
• btlk: a fixed 16 bit ASCII string label for LK.
• Ca ∈ {0, 1}128: 128 bit tag from device A, the commit-
ment value.
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• DHKey ∈ {0, 1}256: Ephemeral DH key.
• Ea ∈ {0, 1}128: 128 bit tag from device A, the check
value.
• IOcapA ∈ {0, 1}24: The IO capability of device A.
• LK ∈ {0, 1}128: A device’s session key, the link key.
• HMAC: a hash-based message authentication code algo-
rithm.
• Na ∈ {0, 1}128: A nonce generated from device A.
• P : generator point for elliptic curve employed.
• PKa = (PKax, PKay) ∈ {0, 1}256 × {0, 1}256: a bit
representation of the ephemeral public key of device A
for an elliptic curve DH key agreement. We write PKax
for the x-coordinate and PKay for the y-coordinate.
• r ∈ {0, . . . , 9}6: A 6-digit, decimal value, the passkey.
• SKa ∈ {0, 1}255: Ephemeral secret key of Device A.
Bluetooth’s specification requires that Na be sampled fresh
for every execution of Passkey Entry, and recommends the
same for SKa, r. In this analysis we assume SKa, Na, and r
are fresh values. We impose this restriction not only to simplify
analysis but also because Passkey Entry with long-term DH
keys allows for potential forward secrecy issues, as only long-
term secrets would factor into session key generation, and long
term passkeys allows for MitM attacks [31].
We state the actual bit lengths for the relevant variables
as required under either BR/EDR Secure Simple Pairing or
Secure Connections Passkey Entry. Secure Simple Pairing
utilizes the P-192 elliptic curve while Secure Connections
uses P-256 [34]. Both modes use SHA-256 [35] for the hash
function and HMAC-SHA256 [28] for the MAC. Also note that
DHKey is computed as the x-coordinate of [SKa]PKb where
[·]· is used to symbolize elliptic curve point multiplication. We
require PKay as part of the public key, by way of validation
checks to prevent the attack described in [8].
IO capability not only determines the version of Bluetooth
AKE (Numeric Comparison, Just Works, Out-of-Band, and
Passkey Entry), but also, for Passkey Entry, how the passkey
is generated (by the initiating device, the responding device,
or the user). Passkey Entry requires a display output on no
more than one device; in the case of a user-generated passkey,
no device display is required. Thus, Passkey Entry can cover
a wider variety of device pairings than other Bluetooth pairing
modes, such as a wireless keyboard and a computer.
B. Protocol Phases
Phase 0: Init and IOcap Exchange.: This phase is not
explicitly listed in the Bluetooth v5.2 specification and is not
a phase of the Passkey Entry protocol as presented therein;
however, it encompasses a variety of steps performed over
an insecure channel before pairing commences including the
sharing of data essential to the protocol. This includes device
discovery for the sharing of identities (A and B), IO capabili-
ties (IOcapA and IOcapB), and initialization of a connection.
Phase 1: Public Key Exchange.: The purpose of Phase
1 is to generate a shared key via an ECDH key agreement.
To accomplish this, the public keys of devices A and B are
exchanged in steps 2 and 3, and the shared key DHKey is





2a. PKa ← [SKa]P
5a. DHKey← [SKa]PKb
6. r $← {0, 1, 2, . . . , 9}6
9a. ra ← r, rb ← r
10a. Na,i
$← {0, 1}128
11a. Ca,i ← HMAC(Na,i, PKax‖PKbx‖ra,i)
17. v2 ← Vfy(Nb,i, (PKbx‖PKax‖ra,i), Cb,i)
18a. Ea ← HMAC(DHKey, Na,20‖Nb,20‖rb‖IOcapA‖A‖B)
22. v4 ← Vfy(DHKey, (Nb,20‖Na,20‖ra‖IOcapB‖B‖A), Eb)





2b. PKb ← [SKb]P
5b. DHKey← [SKb]PKa
6. r $← {0, 1, 2, . . . , 9}6
9b. ra ← r, rb ← r
10b. Nb,i
$← {0, 1}128
11b. Cb,i ← HMAC(Nb,i, PKbx‖PKax‖rb,i)
15. v1 ← Vfy(Na,i, (PKax‖PKbx‖rb,i), Ca,i)
18b. Eb ← HMAC(DHKey, Nb,20‖Na,20‖ra‖IOcapB‖B‖A)
20. v3 ← Vfy(DHKey, (Na,20‖Nb,20‖rb‖IOcapA‖A‖B), Ea)




6. r $← {0, 1, 2, . . . , 9}6
0. A, B, IOcapA, IOcapB
3. PKa
4. PKb
7. r 8. r
8. r 7. r







Phase 0: Init and IOcap Exchange
Phase 1: Public Key Exchange
Phase 2: Authentication Stage 1
Phase 3: Authentication Stage 2
Phase 4: Link Key Calculation
Execute steps 10a - 17




Fig. 3. Passkey Entry. Phase 0 takes place before execution of the protocol;
A, B, IOcapA, and IOcapB are distributed amongst the devices during
this phase. Phase 2, steps 6-8, are version dependent as labeled (for initiator-
generated passkey, responder-generated passkey, and user-generated passkey),
all other steps are version independent.
Phase 2: Authentication Stage 1.: Phase 2 handles authen-
tication through the passkey and has three versions.
• Initiator-Generated Passkey Entry (PE-IG). The initiating
device randomly samples the passkey r, transmits it to the
user, and the user transmits it to the responding device.
• Responder-Generated Passkey Entry (PE-RG). The re-
sponding device randomly samples the passkey r, trans-
mits it to the user, and the user transmits it to the initiating
device.
• User-Generated Passkey Entry (PE-UG). The user ran-
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domly samples the passkey r then sends it to both the
initiating and responding devices.
The devices then proceed to authenticate knowledge of r one
bit at a time, for 20 bits of r in sequence. The HMAC Vfy
algorithm outputs a verification bit, v ∈ {0, 1}. If v1 = 0 or
v2 = 0, the protocol is aborted.
Phase 3: Authentication Stage 2.: This phase completes
entity authentication, binding commitment of the user authen-
ticated passkey to the Phase 1 knowledge shared key, DHKey.
Phase 4: Link Key Calculation.: The purpose of this phase
is the calculation of the link key, LK, and completion of this
phase concludes Passkey Entry.
III. CYBORG SECURITY MODEL
In this section we present the CYBORG security model
as a synthesis of past security models addressing both cyborg-
type protocols [14], [18], [23] and AKEs in general [7], [13],
[26], [29].
There are two main methods of identifying communicating
sessions within a model: matching conversations (as introduced
in [7]) and session identifiers. While matching conversations
capture the concept of agreement over the entirety of the com-
munication transcript, session identifiers usually only cover a
partial transcript. Due to the usual lightweight nature of cyborg
protocols (e.g. in that no certificates are not used) as well as
the potential for lightweight cryptographic algorithms used on
the subsequent channel (as appropriate for IoT use), detecting
any adversarial interference is especially important. Thus, a
variant of matching conversations is appropriate to this model.
However, this is problematic when investigating cyborg
protocols, since messages sent over the UtD channel do not
present an obvious method for inclusion in device transcripts.
Therefore, we present a hybridization of matching conversa-
tions and session identifiers, termed session identifiers with
user, a CYBORG analogue of matching conversations. We
extract relevant messages sent over both UtD and DtD channels
that match between devices.
We extend standard device-device partnering with user-
device partnering. Both forms of partnering play a key role
in the construction of the various freshness definitions (Defi-
nitions III.8 and III.10 to III.11), which we leverage to describe
the varying attack scenarios an adversary may mount.
A. Participant Model
1) Sessions: We define a session to be a single instance
of a protocol and write πAs to refer to the s-th session for
participant A where A ∈ ID ∪ {U}. Let ID be the set of all
possible device identities and U be the identity of the user. We
only allow one user identity in keeping with reasons discussed
in Section III-A3 and [23]. We set no limit on the number of
sessions a single participant can have running at any one time
with any other participant.
2) Devices: We utilize session oracles to capture the partic-
ipation of a device A ∈ ID in a specific session, and describe
the internal state of A as a tuple of the following values:
• skey ∈ K∪{⊥}. This variable holds device A’s completed
session key for the session where K is the associated
keyspace.
• state ∈ {0, 1}∗ ∪ {⊥}. This variable holds other secret
state information.
• role ∈ {initiator, responder,⊥}. This variable holds de-
vice A’s role.
• pid ∈ ID \{A}. This variable holds the identifier for the
partner device.
• sidu ∈ {0, 1}∗ ∪ {⊥}. This variable holds the current
session identifier.
• δ ∈ {accept, reject, ∗}. This variable holds the specific
result of the session either acceptance, rejection, or no
decision, respectively.
At the creation of the s-th session for device A, the ses-
sion oracle πAs is initiated to (skey, state, role, pid, sidu, δ) =
(⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥, ∗). For session acceptance, we require the
following:
δ = accept ⇐⇒ skey 6= ⊥ .
3) Users: The user in the CYBORG protocol is assumed
to be honest, whereby honest means that the user executes its
function exactly as described by the protocol specification, and
is modeled via session oracles, where each session oracle πUj
maintains the following state:
• Two device-session pair identifiers device1 = (A, s) and
device2 = (B, t), where A,B ∈ ID and A 6= B.
4) Partnering: Session identifiers with user follow the
concept of matching conversations, albeit with transcripts
requiring only information that both devices hold.
Definition III.1 (Session Identifiers with User). Let two
session oracles, πAs and π
B
t , execute an authenticated key
exchange protocol, Π, mediated by a user session oracle,
πUj and let the following tuple of messages be the ordered
transcript of all messages sent/received by πAs over the course
of Π:
(msg1, . . . ,msgn) ,
where msgk, is the k-th message sent/received in sequential
order. Then we define the session identifier, denoted sidu, as
the following subsequence of (msg1, . . . ,msgn) pre-appended
by an optional msg0:
for 1 ≤ k ≤ n, we append msgk to πAs .sidu if any of the below
criteria are met:
















j sends msgk to π
B
t , or







from πBt , or






j sends msgk to
πBt .
Information exchanged prior to protocol execution for use
within may optionally be pre-appended to sidu as a fixed msg0.
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Remark. The above definition follows closely to matching
conversations, with two alterations: 1) we remove information
sent between one device and the user which cannot be expected
to be held by the other device, and 2) we allow additional infor-
mation from prior to the protocol run. The second case captures
pre-shared data that is common in user-mediated protocols,
such as Input/Output capabilities (IOcap) in Bluetooth. While
traditional network protocols such as TLS share capabilities
during the protocol run, such as available ciphersuites, such
mutually held data may be defined externally to the protocol
in the lightweight user-mediated setting.
Definition III.2. We say that a session identifier πAs .sidu with
length l ≥ 1 is a prefix of πBt .sidu if all values in πAs .sidu
match and are in the same order as the first l messages in
πBt .sidu.
Definition III.3 (Matching Sessions). We say that a device, A,
at session s has matching session identifiers with device B at
session t if
• πAs .sidu = πBt .sidu where A receives the last message(s),
or
• πBt .sidu is a prefix of πAs .sidu where A sends the last
message(s).
This is a variant of the standard asymmetric definition for
(prefix) matching session identifiers because we must account
for the instance where a device sends the last message and
accepts, but the adversary deletes this message en route to its
intended recipient.
Definition III.4 (Device-Device Partnering). We say sessions
πAs and π
B
t are partnered if π
A
s .pid = B, π
B
t .pid = A,
πAs .role 6= πBt .role, and A and B have matching session
identifiers.
Definition III.5 (User-Device Partnering). If πUj .device1 =






User sessions are opaque to device sessions. Consequently,
if the user is partnered with two device sessions, we assume
that the device sessions always send messages to the correct
partnered user session. We also require that a device session
cannot be partnered with more than one user session, as can
be expected in normal user interactions during device pairing.
In the case of devices executing concurrent sessions, the user
can still distinguish sessions since we assume that ephemeral
passkeys will be used.
B. Adversarial Model
1) Communication Channels.: In this section we look to
explicitly define the capabilities of an adversary in regards
to messages sent over the two communication channels used:
device-to-device (DtD) and user-to-device (UtD).
Definition III.6 (Device-to-Device Channel). An adversary
may read, replay, delete, or modify any message sent between
device oracles πAs , π
B
t and we call this the DtD channel.
Definition III.7 (User-to-Device Channel, Without Eavesdrop-
ping). An adversary may replay or delete any message sent
between a device oracle πAs and user oracle π
U
j , but may not
modify, to include the intended destination, create, nor read
any message. We call this the UtD channel (UtD).
Our definition for the DtD channel allows the adversary full
control over communications sent between devices. However,
we do restrict the adversary’s capability to affect communi-
cations over the UtD channel. We disallow read, modify, and
create capabilities under normal operation, and restrict these to
cases of device or user compromise, modeled via adversarial
access or queries. Ultimately the difference inherent to how
users interact with devices over the UtD channel necessitates
stronger attack capabilities not privy to the typical active
attacker when compared to the DtD channel. Lastly, we note
that allowing eavesdropping over the UtD channel is often
protocol dependent as some protocols require secrecy on that
channel (e.g. in Passkey Entry or ATM pin codes), while others
do not (e.g. Bluetooth Numeric Comparison).
2) Adversarial Queries.: We now present a list of queries
for the adversary to use when interacting with Passkey Entry
participants.
• SendDevice(πAs ,msg). The adversary can use this query
to send a message msg to the given session oracle. The
session oracle will then act on msg as the protocol spec-
ifies and any response will be returned to the adversary.
If msg = (start, B) for B ∈ ID, a non-protocol specific
special initiation message, is the first message the given
session oracle has received then it will set role = initiator
and pid = B and output the first protocol message. This
allows the adversary to initiate a protocol run between two
identities. Else, if the first message a device session oracle
receives does not consist of the non-protocol specific
special initiation message and comes from B ∈ ID, then
the oracle sets pid = B, role = responder, and executes
the protocol as intended in the role of the responder.
• SendUser(πUj ,msg). The adversary can use this query to
send a message msg to the given user session oracle
πUj . The session oracle will then act on msg as the
protocol specifies and any response will be returned to
the adversary. If msg = (start, (πAs , π
B
t )) for A,B ∈ ID,
a non-protocol specific special initiation message, is the
first message the given session oracle has received, then
U first checks if πAs or π
B
t were ever part of a received
msg = (start, ·) message for any session πUj′ . If so, the
session outputs ⊥. Else, the session sets device1 = (A, s)
and device2 = (B, t). Else, if the first message received
by πUj does not consist of such a start message, the session
oracle outputs ⊥. The session oracle will then execute the
protocol in the role of the user as intended with the given
device identities.
• StateReveal(πAs ). The adversary may use this query to
obtain access to the session state information state.
• KeyReveal(πAs ). The adversary may use this query to
obtain access to the session key skey.
• ShowUser(πAs ). This query outputs ⊥. After this query,
the adversary can modify or create any UtD message sent
from the given device to the user within πAs .
• ControlUser(πUj , A). This query outputs ⊥. After this
query, the adversary can modify or create any UtD
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message sent from the user U to the device A of the
current session.
• Test(πAs ). This query may only be asked once throughout
the game. If πAs .δ 6= accept, this query returns ⊥. Else,
it samples b $← {0, 1}, and sets k ← πAs .skey if b = 1
and k $← {0, 1}λ otherwise. The query outputs kb.
These queries were developed to model compromise of a
device or a user in keeping with modeling real-world attacks.
The SendDevice, StateReveal, Corrupt, KeyReveal and Test
queries are typical variants used to model the adversary’s
ability to control the experiment and compromise a device’s
internals via side-channel or malware. SendUser is needed to
allow the adversary to initialize user session oracles and also
to give him the ability to send messages to the user as desired.
The two queries, ShowUser and ControlUser, are included to
give the adversary the ability to compromise the UtD channel.
ShowUser models the adversary gaining control over a device
and inducing it to send messages to the user, via malware-
induced pop-ups for example. Meanwhile the ControlUser
query gives the adversary the ability to affect messages input to
the device from the user, such as from a Ghost Touch Generator
or social engineering. The ShowUser and ControlUser queries
are also restricted in effect to specific sessions. This is done to
capture the idea that adversary compromise of the UtD channel
can have a time-sensitive nature.
3) User and Device Freshness.: Typically, freshness has
only been defined with respect to devices. This made sense
when only devices engaged in the action of the protocol, but
with the advent of cyborg protocols it becomes necessary to
define freshness for device and user session oracles. The un-
compromised setting enables us to test the baseline security of
the protocol, which restricts the adversary’s use of both device
and user-oriented queries. In the compromised user setting,
the adversary gains varying abilities to issue combinations
of ShowUser and ControlUser queries. The freshness types
([iu], [ru], [ui] and [ur] are depicted visually in Figure 2). We
define a corresponding device freshness that is used to assess
key indistinguishability in the security experiment, wherein the
adversary may not reveal device secrets; the adversary has
much more liberty to reveal device secrets when attempting
to break authentication.
Definition III.8 (Device Freshness). We say that a device
session oracle πAs is fresh in the uncompromised setting
(UncUser-fresh) and fresh under compromised user type [x]
(CompUser[x]-fresh) unless any of the following hold:
• the adversary issues a StateReveal(πAs ) query, or
• if there exists a session oracle πBt partnered with πAs and
the adversary issues a StateReveal(πBt ) query, or
• the adversary has issued a KeyReveal(πAs ) query, or
• if there exists a session oracle, πBt , partnered with πAs
and the adversary issues a KeyReveal(πBt ) query.
The freshness conditions whereby we restrict adversarial
reveals on both the target device session and a partnered
device session is in keeping with precedent. The restriction of
adversarial queries on a device partnered with the same user
oracle is analogous to restricting corruption of the intended
partner’s long-term keys. Cyborg key exchange protocols rely
on the user to authenticate devices in the same vein as a
Certificate Authority authenticates devices in typical AKE;
thus, we rely on the user’s authentication of the intended
partner to limit reveals.
Definition III.9 (User Freshness under No Compromise). We
say that a session oracle πUj is fresh in the uncompromised
setting (UncUser-fresh) unless any of the following hold:
• the adversary has issued a ShowUser(πAs ) query before
the last UtD message is sent and received between πUj
and πAs according to the protocol, where π
U
j is partnered
with πAs , or
• the adversary has issued a ControlUser(πUj , A) query
before the last UtD message is sent and received between
πUj and π
A
s according to the protocol, where π
U
j is
partnered with πAs .
We now focus on the freshness scenario under user com-
promise, which replaces the traditional view of the user as a
perfect OOB channel (i.e. an uncompromised user).
Definition III.10 (User Freshness under Compromise Type iu
and ru). We say that a session oracle πUj for U and session
j is fresh under compromised user, type iu (resp. type ru),
denoted CompUser[iu]-fresh (resp. CompUser[ru]-fresh) unless
• the adversary has issued a ShowUser(πAs ) query before
the last UtD message is sent and received between πUj
and πAs according to the protocol, where π
U
j is partnered
with πAs , and
◦ (if CompUser[iu] :) πAs .role = responder
◦ (if CompUser[ru] :) πAs .role = initiator
or
• the adversary has issued a ControlUser(πUj , A) query
before the last UtD message is sent and received between
πUj and π
A
s according to the protocol, where π
U
j is
partnered with πAs .
Definition III.11 (User Freshness under Compromise Type ui
and ur). We say that a session oracle πUj for U and session
j is fresh under compromised user, type ui (resp. type ur),
denoted CompUser[ui]-fresh (resp. CompUser[ur]-fresh) unless
• the adversary has issued a ShowUser(πAs ) query before
the last UtD message is sent and received between πUj
and πAs according to the protocol, where π
U
j is partnered
with πAs , or
• the adversary has issued a ControlUser(πUj , A) query
before the last UtD message is sent and received between
πUj and π
A
s according to the protocol, where π
U
j is
partnered with πAs , and
◦ (if CompUser[ui] :) πAs .role = responder
◦ (if CompUser[ur] :) πAs .role = initiator
We restrict the adversary from making ShowUser and
ControlUser queries dependent on the role of the device
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session, such that only one UtD channel may be compromised
in each type (denoted in red/dashes in Figure 2). This decision
allows us to focus on the exact circumstances under which a
protocol breaks.
Definition III.12 (User Freshness under Compromise Type
Combinations). Let X be a non-empty subset of the set
{iu, ru, ui, ur}; we refer to the set X with the label string
x constructed from the elements of X in sequential order.
We then say that a session oracle πUj for U and session j is
termed fresh under compromised user, type x (CompUser[x]-
fresh) unless the adversary issues a single query which breaks
CompUser[xi]-freshness simultaneously for all xi ∈ X .
Note that a session oracle’s freshness must be assessed
per query under CompUser[x]-fresh; said query must break
freshness for the session oracle in all the elements of the set X
individually. This structuring of CompUser[x]-fresh is needed
so we can capture more advanced attacks that an adversary
may mount. Using only select definitions from among Defini-
tions III.10 to III.11 we would be unable to capture the “Tap
‘n Ghost” attack as it involves the corruption of the communi-
cation channels both from a device to the user and vice versa.
However, we can model this using the CompUser[iu,ui]-fresh.
In a CompUser[iu,ui]-fresh environment, the adversary would
be allowed to issue both a ShowUser and a ControlUser query
so long as both involved the initiating device; and similarly in a
CompUser[ru,ur]-fresh environment for the responding device.
C. CYBORG Security Experiment
In light of all previous definitions, we now present the
CYBORG security experiment for the reader.
Definition III.13. We define the CYBORG-type security ex-
periment for a PPT adversarial algorithm A against a cy-
borg key exchange protocol Π, and interacting with a chal-
lenger via all previously defined adversarial queries in the
EXPCYBORG-typeΠ,A,ηp,ηs experiment, where ηp is the maximum num-
ber of device participants and ηs is the maximum number of
sessions for any participant. We say that the adversary A wins
the experiment with the challenger outputting 1 if any of the
following conditions hold for type ∈ {UncUser,CompUser}.
1) Correctness (correct):




• πAs and πBt are both partnered with the type-fresh user
oracle πUj , and
• πAs .δ 6= accept, or
• πBt .δ 6= accept.
2) Entity Authentication (auth):
there exists a type-fresh session oracle πAs where:
• πAs .δ = accept with intended partner pid = B and
• πAs is partnered with the type-fresh user oracle πUj , and
• if πUj is also partnered with πBt , A has not issued a
StateReveal(πBt ) query while π
A
s .δ 6= accept, and
• there does not exist a unique session oracle at B that
is partnered with πAs .
3) Key Indistinguishability (key-ind):
at some point in the experiment A issued a Test(πAs )
query on a type-fresh session oracle πAs , where
• πAs .δ = accept with intended partner pid = B, and
• πAs is partnered with a type-fresh user oracle πUj , and
• if πUj is also partnered with πBt , A has not issued a
StateReveal(πBt ) query while π
A
s .δ 6= accept, and
• there exists an oracle πBt′ partnered with πAs , and
• at some subsequent point in the experiment πAs re-
sponds with its guess b, where Pr[b = b] ≥ 1/2 where
b is the randomly sampled bit from the associated Test
query.
Else, the challenger outputs 0. We denote the adversary A
winning the experiment and the challenger outputting 1 as:
EXPCYBORG-typeΠ,A,ηp,ηs (λ) = 1 .
We define the advantage for the PPT adversarial algorithm A
in the above experiment to be:
AdvCYBORG-typeΠ,A,ηp,ηs (λ) := Pr[EXP
CYBORG-type
Π,A,ηp,ηs (λ) = 1] .
Definition III.14. If there exists a negligible function negl(λ)
such that for all PPT adversaries A interacting according to
the CYBORG-type experiment, it holds that:
AdvCYBORG-typeΠ,A,ηp,ηs (λ) ≤ negl(λ) ,
then we say that the protocol Π is CYBORG-type-secure.
The above definition presents a change from META in
that we require two partnered oracles to imply acceptance,
as captured by correct. This is a reasonable assumption when
acceptance is not conditioned by a concluding user input.
IV. ANALYSIS OF PASSKEY ENTRY
In this section we present the initial results of our analysis
of Passkey Entry under the CYBORG security model and
show that all versions of Passkey Entry fail to meet any version
of CYBORG security. For Inititiator/Responder-Generated
Passkey Entry, this is because the first 19 generated nonces
are not authenticated in Phase 3, which leads to an adversarial
forgery based off a single bit guess and consequently failure of
session matching. Meanwhile, User-Generated Passkey Entry
fails to achieve CYBORG security because role agreement is
not guaranteed through protocol execution.
We define the session-state information for all versions of
Passkey Entry and a given session oracle πAs as:
πAs .state = (SKa, r,Na,1, . . . , Na,20) ,
where all values are as defined in Section II. We capture
all randomly generated information a device considers secret
in the session-state. Although nonces are made public in the
course of the protocol, they are included here as they are used
as secret keys before such disclosure.
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Since all versions of Passkey Entry are susceptible to
passkey re-use attacks [31], the passkey r must be generated
as an ephemeral secret. This presents a unique modeling
challenge. If generated by a device, the passkey may be derived
from the same source of randomness as other ephemeral keys
or nonces. If generated by a user however, this is not the case.
In this scenario, it becomes necessary to operate under the
assumption that the user has some means of random number





2a. PKa ← [SKa]P
5a. DHKey← [SKa]PKb
9a. ra ← r, rb ← r
10a. Na,i
$← {0, 1}128
11a. Ca,i ← HMAC(Na,i, PKax‖PKbx‖ra,i)
17. v2 ← Vfy(Nb,i, (PKbx‖PKax‖ra,i), Cb,i)
18a. Ea ← HMAC(DHKey, Na,20‖Nb,20‖rb‖IOcapA‖A‖B)
22. v4 ← Vfy(DHKey, (Nb,20‖Na,20‖ra‖IOcapB‖B‖A), Eb)





2a’. PKb ← [SKb]P
5a’. DHKey← [SKb]PKa
9a’. ra ← r, rb ← r
10a’. Nb,i
$← {0, 1}128
11a’. Cb,i ← HMAC(Nb,i, PKbx‖PKax‖rb,i)
17’. v2′ ← Vfy(Na,i, (PKax‖PKbx‖rb,i), Ca,i)
18a’. Eb ← HMAC(DHKey, Nb,20‖Na,20‖ra‖IOcapB‖B‖A)
22’. v4′ ← Vfy(DHKey, (Na,20‖Nb,20‖rb‖IOcapA‖A‖B), Ea)





6. r $← {0, 1, 2, . . . , 9}6
0. A, B, IOcapA, IOcapB
3. PKa 3’. PKb
4. PKb 4’. PKa
7. r 7’. r
12. Ca,i 12’. Cb,i
13. Cb,i 13’. Ca,i
14. Na,i 14’. Nb,i
16. Nb,i 16’. Na,i
19. Ea 19’. Eb
21. Eb 21’. Ea
Phase 0: Init and IOcap Exchange
Phase 1: Public Key Exchange
Phase 2: Authentication Stage 1
Phase 3: Authentication Stage 2
Phase 4: Link Key Calculation
Execute steps 10a - 17
twenty times in sequence
Fig. 4. Role confusion attack on User-Generated Passkey Entry that results in
two devices, both in the initiator role, accepting. Adversary shown by dashes.
First we define the session identifier for all versions of
Passkey Entry from a correctly executed session involving an
initiating device, e.g. A, and responding device, e.g. B, as
described in Section III-A4:
sidu := ((A,B, IOcapA, IOcapB), PKa, PKb, r, Ca,1, . . .
. . . , Cb,1, Na,1, Nb,1, Ca,20, Cb,20, Na,20, Nb,20, Ea, Eb).
Note that identities are shown as an example above, and A
may be either an initiating device or responding device in the
following analysis, specified where appropriate.
Theorem IV.1. Initiator-Generated and Responder-Generated
Passkey Entry are not CYBORG-UncUser-secure.
Proof: We prove Theorem IV.1 via a counter-example by
describing how an adversary can entice a device to accept
maliciously in the Initiator-Generated Passkey Entry case. The
case of Responder-Generated Passkey Entry follows similarly.
Let A be an adversarial algorithm against the
CYBORG-UncUser security of Initiator-Generated Passkey
Entry. The adversary first issues a SendDevice(πAs , (start, B))
to initiate a protocol run between devices A and B, and




t ))) query to initiate the
associated user oracle. The adversary then allows the
protocol to progress through step 8. At this point, A then
makes a guess re,i for the bit value of ra,i used by the
initiating device to construct Ca,i where 1 ≤ i ≤ 19. A then
randomly samples a new nonce Ne,i and calculates a new
tag Ce,i = HMAC(Ne,i, PKax‖PKbx‖re,i). When device A
attempts to send Ca,i to device B in step 12, the adversary
replaces this value with Ce,i, and similarly replaces Na,i with
Ne,i in step 14. If we have that ra,i = re,i, then device B’s
verification in step 15 will succeed; A will then take no further
actions and allow the protocol to proceed to completion. This
will lead to both πAs and π
B
t accepting but they will not have
matching session identifiers since they will disagree on the
values for Ca,i and Na,i and A succeeds in breaking auth.
Since A’s guess of ra,i is correct with probability one-half,
we have that AdvCYBORG-UncUserPE-IG,A,ηp,ηs (λ) ≥ 1/2 .
In User-Generated Passkey Entry an adversary can mount
a “role confusion” attack on the pairing devices (illustrated
in Figure 4 and described in the proof of Theorem IV.2
below). This attack leads to both devices accepting although
neither actually pairs with the other. Similar attacks have been
previously shown on other protocols [5].
Theorem IV.2. User-Generated Passkey Entry is not
CYBORG-UncUser-secure.
Proof: Let A be an adversarial algorithm against the
CYBORG-UncUser security of User-Generated Passkey En-
try. A first issues a SendUser(πUj , (start, (πAs , πBt ))) to ini-
tiate the user for a protocol run between devices A and
B. A then issues both a SendDevice(πAs , (start, B)) and a
SendDevice(πBt , (start, A)) query. A will then function as an
intermediary between the session oracles πAs and π
B
t , which
both run the protocol in the role of the initiating device. After
both device A and B exchange their public keys through the
adversary, they will be ready to accept the passkey from the
user. The user inputs a passkey into both devices according
to the protocol (note that the device session role is opaque to
the user). A then simply relays all relevant protocol messages
between device A and device B in keeping with the description
of User-Generated Passkey Entry. At the conclusion of the
above attack, we have that A has won the CYBORG-UncUser
security experiment by breaking auth, since πAs and π
B
t have
both accepted but there does not exist a paired UncUser-fresh
session oracle for either device, due to role disagreement.
In summary, all versions of Passkey Entry do not meet
any level of CYBORG security. Even though Passkey Entry
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was originally developed to prevent offline dictionary attacks
by using 20 commitments (one commitment for each bit of
the passkey), it allows for breaks in auth. Note that the proof
in Theorem IV.1 can also be used as a counter-example for
User-Generated Passkey Entry insecurity.
V. MODIFIED PASSKEY ENTRY
In this section we present two modified Passkey Entry
protocol variants (see Figure 5). With these modifications,
Passkey Entry can achieve complete CYBORG security (see
analysis in Section VI). We demonstrate these modifications as
a proof-of-concept that CYBORG security is achievable with
interaction from both devices and full transcript validation.
Modifications were made with the goal of introducing
minimal change to the protocol, as well as restricting most
changes to Phase 2 in keeping with the requirements for
modular construction of Bluetooth protocols.
• Secure Hash Modification (SHM): This modification
requires the addition of a collision-resistant hash function,
H, with a 128-bit output length (in keeping with the
specified nonce length).
◦ Concatenate and hash all of a device’s previously gen-
erated nonces to form Na and Nb (steps 8c and 8d). Na
and Nb replace Na,20 and Nb,20 in all further Phases.
This ensures computation of the check values Ea and
Eb rely on all generated nonces. It also prevents the bit
guessing attack described in the proof of Theorem IV.1.
◦ Include device role in the computation of Na and Nb.
Each device declares their role and the assumed role
of their partner in the hash computation over Na, Nb
using the labels init and resp for the initiator and
responder respectively. This protects against the role
mix-up attack described in the proof of Theorem IV.2.
◦ Include both IOcap variables in the computation of
Ea and Eb. This ensures authentication of both IOcap
capabilities.
• Dual Passkey Entry (DPE): This modifcation requires
the initiator and responder to both possess a numerical
display and numerical input capabilities.
◦ Each device generates a passkey and shares this value
via the user. The initiator relays its passkey ra to the
responder through the user, followed similarly by the
responder with rb. This prevents display output and/or
input compromise.
Dual Passkey Entry’s reliance on device’s possessing both
numerical displays and keypad entry is more in line with the
requirements for Numeric Comparison, which requires both
devices to have both numerical displays and binary inputs.
Traditional Passkey Entry in comparison requires a display and
entry mechanism on respective, instead of both, devices (for
Initiator Generated and Responder Generated Passkey Entry),
or only requires entry mechanisms on both (for User Generated
Passkey Entry). This begs the question of whether simply
using Numeric Comparison would be a viable alternative vice
a new protocol. Although we do not devote a full analysis
to Numeric Comparison under the CYBORG model due to
space constraints, observation suggests that Numeric Compar-
ison would not achieve full CYBORG security. In particular,
Numeric Comparison requires identical and predictable binary
user inputs on both devices (to confirm whether two displayed
values match [10]). Under CompUser[ui] and/or CompUser[ur]
freshness definitions the adversary could modify the user
confirmation/denial message to allow a MitM attack to advance
regardless of matching in the actual values displayed.
The SHM falls very closely to techniques used in other
protocols and brings Passkey Entry more in line with accepted
techniques for protecting against downgrades. For example,
TLS 1.3 [38] computes the Finished message over ex-
changed ciphersuites, thereby ensuring that both parties agree
to exchanged capabilities. However, while this change adds
authenticity against transcript modification during Phase 2 of
the protocol, it does not prevent a more direct downgrade;
namely, if the IOcap was changed to Just Works, the Passkey
Entry protocol would not be completed at all. In terms of
overhead, the SHM notably adds only one hash computation
per party. In comparison, Passkey Entry already requires 21
HMAC computations and 21 HMAC verifications per party.
In contrast, DPE demonstrates a straightforward analogue
to certificate usage. Passkey Entry is uni-directional in the
user receipt and relay of the passkey; one can think of it as
similar to a server-only certificate. DPE in comparison is bi-
directional, analogous to certificates on both sides. Some cases
of lightweight devices without suitable I/O capabilities exist
where DPE may not be possible. However, for such cases
where mutual authentication is unachievable, the results of
Section IV and shown in Table I provide particular guidance.
Namely, by demonstrating which compromise scenarios are
fatal to the protocol in Table I, manufacturers and end users
gain insight on the device that is most in need of protection
(i.e. dependent on the device that is generating a passkey) and
under what conditions.
VI. ANALYSIS OF MODIFIED PROTOCOL
The following analysis covers all four versions of
Passkey Entry (Initiator-Generated, Responder-Generated,
User-Generated, and Dual) with the Secure Hash Modifi-
cation (signified by the “SHM” prefix) under both security
environments defined in the CYBORG model: UncUser and
CompUser. For CompUser, each version of the SHM Passkey
protocol is analyzed under each of our four baseline definitions
of compromised user scenarios (Definitions III.10 to III.11).
We operate under the definitions for session-state and the sidu
described in Section IV.
Initiator-Generated Passkey: We start with results for the
SHM Initiator-Generated Passkey Entry protocol as follows,
covering all variants under the CYBORG security model.
Theorem VI.1. SHM Initiator-Generated Passkey Entry is
• CYBORG-UncUser-secure under
the EC-sym-ssPRF-ODH and EC-DDH assumptions, the
sec-pre of H, and the SUF-CMA security of HMAC.
• CYBORG-CompUser[x]-secure for







$← {0, 1, 2, . . . , 9}6
11a. Na,i
$← {0, 1}128
12a. Ca,i ← HMAC(Na,i, PKax‖PKbx‖ra,i‖rb,i)
18. v2 ← Vfy(Nb,i, (PKbx‖PKax‖rb,i‖ra,i), Cb,i)
19a/b. Na ← H(Na,1‖ . . . ‖Na,20‖init), Nb ← H(Nb,1‖ . . . ‖Nb,20‖resp)
20a. Ea ← HMAC(DHKey, Na‖Nb‖rb‖IOcapA‖IOcapB‖A‖B)
24. v4 ← Vfy(DHKey, (Nb‖Na‖ra‖IOcapB‖IOcapA‖B‖A), Eb)
25a/b. LK← HMAC(DHKey, Na‖Nb‖btlk‖A‖B)
6b. rb
$← {0, 1, 2, . . . , 9}6
11b. Nb,i
$← {0, 1}128
12b. Cb,i ← HMAC(Nb,i, PKbx‖PKax‖rb,i‖ra,i)
16. v1 ← Vfy(Na,i, (PKax‖PKbx‖ra,i‖rb,i), Ca,i)
20b. Eb ← HMAC(DHKey, Nb‖Na‖ra‖IOcapB‖IOcapA‖B‖A)
22. v3 ← Vfy(DHKey, (Na‖Nb‖rb‖IOcapA‖IOcapB‖A‖B), Ea)
User
User
7. ra 8. ra







Phase 2: Authentication Stage 1
Phase 3: Authentication Stage 2
Phase 4: Link Key Calculation
Execute steps 11a - 18
twenty times in sequence
Dual Passkey Entry
Secure Hash Modification
Fig. 5. Dual Passkey Entry with Secure Hash Modification. Dual Passkey
Entry (DPE) is depicted with the modifications in blue, where both devices
generate passkeys.The Secure Hash Modification (SHM) is depicted green
and can be used in conjunction with DPE or any version of Passkey Entry.
Under this modification all nonces are hashed into the new values Na, Nb
for subsequent use. Devices also declare assumed roles, using the strings init
and resp, and both IOcap variables are used in the computation of Ea, Eb.
• not CYBORG-CompUser[x]-secure for
[x] ∈{[iu], [ur], [iu, ru], [iu, ui], [iu, ur], [ru, ur], [ui, ur],
[iu, ru, ui], [iu, ru, ur], [iu, ui, ur], [ru, ui, ur],
[iu, ru, ui, ur]} .
The proofs for the above theorems can be found in Ap-
pendix C-A. We provide a proof sketch for the CYBORG-
UncUser setting here, which serves as the basis for other proof
variants in the positive results (for negative results, counter-
examples are shown in Appendix C-A).
Proof Sketch: The proof of this theorem involves a series
of game hops between an adversarial PPT algorithm A and the
challenger. We denote the adversarial advantage of a specific
game as Advi, for the i-th game hop.
Game 0. This game is equivalent to the original security
experiment. Thus we have Adv0 = Adv
CYBORG-UncUser
PE-IG,A,ηp,ηs (λ).
Game 1. In this game we abort if two session oracles ever
generate the same ephemeral DH key, SK, of length µ. Thus
we have Adv1 ≥ Adv0 − (ηpηs)2 · 2-µ.
Game 2. In this game we abort if we ever have nonce collision,
and there are 20 nonces generated each session. Thus we have
Adv2 ≥ Adv1 − 400 · (ηpηs)2 · 2-λ.
Game 3. In this game we abort if a passkey, r, is ever re-used.
Thus we have Adv3 ≥ Adv2 − (ηpηs)2 · 2-|r|.
Game 4. In this game we the guess the target session oracle,
πAs , and its partner, π
B
t , uniformly at random, and abort if A
does not attempt to win against this guessed pair. Thus we
have Adv4 ≥ (ηpηs)
-2 ·Adv3.
We then continue by game-hopping dependent on whether
A attempts to win by breaking correct, auth, or key-ind. Thus







Advantage against correct. This step is straightforward.
Advantage against auth.
Game 5. In this game we abort if A succeeds in forging the DH
public keys PKa, PKb. To forge public keys, A must guess
all 20 bits of the passkey r. Accounting for πAs in the initiator
and responder roles, we have Advauth5 ≥ Adv
auth
4 − 2-(|r|−1).
Game 6. In this game we replace DHKey = [SKa]PKb =
[SKb]PKa with the uniformly random value D̃HKey. By the
EC-DDH assumption, A is unable to distinguish this change.





We continue the proof by first separating two sub-cases
based on the test session’s role: initiator (C1) or responder





Case 1: πAs .role = initiator.
Game 7. In this game we abort if A succeeds in forging
Eb = HMAC(D̃HKey, Nb‖Na‖ra‖IOcapB‖B‖A), Nb, B,
or IOcapB, and thereby getting A to accept maliciously. We
bound this ability by the SUF-CMA security of HMAC. Thus





Game 8. In this game we abort if A succeeds in forging any
of B’s nonces or B’s role, causing A to accept maliciously.
From Game 7 we have that A does not succeed in forging Nb.
This lets us bound this ability by the sec-pre security of H.





By Game 8 we have matching sidu (A cannot forge
Ca,i, Cb,i due to the correctness of HMAC), πAs .pid = B,
πBt .pid = A, π
A
s .role 6= πBt .role. Thus via Definition III.4 our
session oracles are partnered and we have Advauth,C18 = 0 .
Case 2: πAs .role = responder. This case follows as in Case 1.
Advantage against key-ind.
Game 5. In this game we replace LK =
HMAC(DHKey, Na‖Nb‖btlk‖A‖B) (if πAs .role = initiator)
with the uniformly random value L̃K. By the
hardness of the EC-sym-ssPRF-ODH assumption, A






for πAs in either the initiator or responder role.
Since the session key of our test oracle is now uniformly
random, we conclude Advkey-ind5 = 0.
The above proof demonstrates the CYBORG security of
Initiator-Generated Passkey Entry in the UncUser setting, con-
ditioned on the security of the underlying algorithms as well
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as nonce length, passkey length, etc. Still, per Passkey Entry
specification, the passkey has length |r| = 20. Consequently,
this result demonstrates that the actual security level is below
the simple guessing ability for 20 bits.
Since a EC-sym-ssPRF-ODH is a PRF-based security
notion (detailed in Section A) and as such may not appear
as a typical MAC security assumption, we comment here
on related work regarding the PRF security of HMAC [28].
HMAC was shown to be a PRF so long as its underlying
hash function was a PRF [6]. It has also been shown that
HMAC satisfies a strong notion of PRF-ODH security under
the random oracle model [11]. Thus the EC-sym-ssPRF-ODH
security assumption for HMAC is not out-of-scope.
Responder-Generated Passkey: Analysis results for the
SHM Responder-Generated Passkey Entry protocol are as
follows, covering all variants under the CYBORG security
model. The proof follows similarly to that of Theorem VI.1
in Appendix C-A. Due to space constraints, details are left to
the full version.
Theorem VI.2. SHM Responder-Generated Passkey Entry is
• CYBORG-UncUser-secure under
the EC-sym-ssPRF-ODH and EC-DDH assumptions, the
sec-pre of H, and the SUF-CMA security of HMAC.
• CYBORG-CompUser[x]-secure for
[x] ∈ {[iu], [ur], [iu, ur]} .
• not CYBORG-CompUser[x]-secure for
[x] ∈{[ru], [ui], iu, ru], [iu, ui], [ru, ui], [ru, ur], [ui, ur],
[iu, ru, ui], [iu, ru, ur], [iu, ui, ur], [ru, ui, ur],
[iu, ru, ui, ur]} .
User-Generated Passkey: Analysis results for the SHM
User-Generated Passkey Entry protocol are as follows, cover-
ing all variants under the CYBORG security model. The proof
follows similarly to that of Theorem VI.1 in Appendix C-A.
Due to space constraints, details are left to the full version.
Theorem VI.3. SHM User-Generated Passkey Entry is
• CYBORG-UncUser-secure under
the EC-sym-ssPRF-ODH and EC-DDH assumptions, the
sec-pre of H, and the SUF-CMA security of HMAC.
• CYBORG-CompUser[x]-secure for
[x] ∈ {[iu], [ru], [iu, ru]}.
• not CYBORG-CompUser[x]-secure for
[x] ∈{[ui], [ur], [iu, ui], [iu, ur], [ru, ui], [ru, ur], [ui, ur],
[iu, ru, ui], [iu, ru, ur], [iu, ui, ur], [ru, ui, ur],
[iu, ru, ui, ur]}.
Dual Passkey: Analysis results for the SHM Dual Passkey
Entry protocol are as follows, covering all variants under the
CYBORG security model.
Theorem VI.4. SHM Dual Passkey Entry is CYBORG-
CompUser[iu,ru,ui,ur]-secure under the EC-sym-ssPRF-ODH
and EC-DDH assumptions, the sec-pre of H, and the
SUF-CMA security of HMAC.
Proof details can be found in Appendix C-B.
Implications: SHM Passkey Entry achieved similar secu-
rity across all versions, with variations only in the CompUser[x]
setting. The various results give insight into the type of attacks
Passkey Entry in its current construction can defend against.
Mainly gaining control of the device display used to generate
the passkey, or the device input of the passkey receiver is fatal
to protocol security. This holds true for all current versions
of Passkey Entry and points to the motivation behind DPE,
namely that by having both devices generate a passkey, there
is always a part of the “whole” passkey that the adversary
cannot replace, regardless of the device’s initiator/responder
role. By Bluetooth specification, secrecy on the UtD channel
is essential (reflected in the CYBORG model); thus, while the
adversary can forge one r value, it may not read either one.
With both devices generating passkeys, the adversary can-
not leverage its corruption queries to gain knowledge of
the target session’s passkey(s). We note that these security
guarantees do not allow for eavesdropping, which is reasonable
under Passkey Entry requirements. This shows that one can
create protocols achieving a greater of degree of security than
current methods with minimal increases in user involvement,
and reasonable to device requirements. With the integrity of at
least one of the passkeys ensured (by the fact that each device
generates a passkey), devices can successfully authenticate the
DH key exchange. As proven in Theorem VI.4, Dual Passkey
Entry maintains CYBORG security in spite of the adversary
having the full capability to modify UtD messages and without
requiring the user to generate random numbers.
VII. CONCLUSION
Human interaction in protocols presents an intriguing
challenge for analysis, encompassing the two-sided issues
of human-device teaming down to the cryptographic level.
Although Passkey Entry in its current construction fails to
meet our measure of a secure cyborg key exchange under
any variant, we showed how minor modifications improved its
capability to achieve a robust level of security. Furthermore, we
introduced SHM Dual Passkey Entry, which provably provides
defense against the combined and advanced attacks already in
existence that exploit corruption of displayed messages to users
and user inputs to devices simultaneously.
The Secure Hash Modification presents a minor change
that is reflective of normative practice in other real-world
protocols, which do not rely on human interaction. We have
shown that even such a minor change enables security under
some CYBORG variants. The results, summarized in Table I,
provide user and manufacturer guidance in the use of an SHM-
modified Passkey Entry. In particular, although full CYBORG
security cannot be achieved, other variants can be.
Our results are not only relevant in the security they
establish and design indications for such success, but also
in the classes of CYBORG insecurity they demonstrate for
Passkey Entry. For example, from Table I it is clear that a range
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of attacks exist on Passkey Entry in its current form. Notably,
as shown in the table, Passkey Entry cannot be protected from
the Tap n’ Ghost attack even under SHM (CompUser[iu,ui] and
CompUser[ru,ur]). Using this work, any attack that can lever-
age a device display input/output according to the categories
we have shown, gains a blueprint for successful execution.
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APPENDIX A
SECURITY ASSUMPTIONS
We present relevant security properties of hash functions
and hash-based message authentication codes that will prove
consequential to our analysis of Passkey Entry. We also intro-
duce relevant Diffie-Hellman (DH) problems to our analysis.
Second-Preimage Resistance:
Definition A.1. Let H be a hash function and A a PPT
adversary. We define the Second-Preimage Resistance (sec-pre)
of H as such: given msg ∈ {0, 1}∗ and hash value such that
H(msg) = hash, A cannot find a second-preimage, msg′ ∈
{0, 1}∗, such that msg′ 6= msg and H(msg′) = hash with
more than negligible probability. We denote A’s advantage in
breaking sec-pre of H as Advsec-preH,A .
SUF-CMA of a MAC: In Figure 6 we display the security
game for strong unforgeability under chosen message attack
(SUF-CMA) in algorithmic notation. This experiment models
an attacker’s ability to break the unforgeability of a MAC by
forging a new message or a new tag of a known message-tag
pair that verifies correctly.
EXPSUF-CMAMAC,A (λ):
1: K $← Kgn(1λ)





2: S ← S ∪ {(msg, tag)}
3: return tag
MAC.Vfy(msg, tag):
1: v← Vfy(K,msg, tag)
2: if (v = 1)∧((msg, tag) /∈ S) then
3: win← 1
4: return win from exp.
5: end if
6: return v
Fig. 6. Security experiment for strong unforgeability under chosen message
attack (SUF-CMA) of a message authentication code algorithm MAC =
(Kgn,MAC,Vfy) and adversary A.
Definition A.2. We define the adversarial advantage against
the SUF-CMA experiment described in Figure 6 for a PPT
adversary A against a message authentication code MAC to
be:
AdvSUF-CMAMAC,A (λ) := Pr[EXP
SUF-CMA
MAC,A (λ) = 1] .
Definition A.3. We say that some message authentication
code MAC is SUF-CMA-secure if the advantage for any
PPT adversary A interacting according to the experiment
EXPSUF-CMAMAC,A (λ) is upper bounded by some negligible function
negl(λ):
AdvSUF-CMAMAC,A (λ) ≤ negl(λ) .
EC-DDH Assumption:
Definition A.4. Let E be an elliptic curve over the field Fq with
generator point P of order n. Let A be a PPT adversary. We
state the Elliptic Curve Decisional DH (EC-DDH) assumption
as such: given access to E, P , and knowledge of aP and bP
for a, b $← Fq and a, b < n,A cannot distinguish abP from cP ,
for c $← Fq and c < n, with more than negligible probability.
We use AdvEC-DDHA to write A’s advantage in breaking the
EC-DDH assumption.
EC-sym-ssPRF-ODH Assumption: The PRF-ODH was
originally introduced in [26], and later modified [17], [19].
Other PRF-ODH assumption variants were analyzed in [11],
with the sym-ssPRF-ODH assumption of [19] being a variant
thereof. We present to the sym-ssPRF-ODH assumption of [19]
below, but for Elliptic Curve (EC) Diffie–Hellman vs. standard
Diffie–Hellman.
Definition A.5. Let E be an elliptic curve over the field Fq
with generator point P of order n. Let PRFλ : E×{0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}λ be a psuedorandom function with keys in E, input
strings in {0, 1}∗, and output strings in {0, 1}λ. Let A be a
PPT adversary. Elliptic Curve symmetric generic single-single
PRF Oracle DH assumption (EC-sym-ssPRF-ODH) is defined
as follows:
1) The challenger samples a, b $← Fq uniformly at random
with a, b < n, computes aP and bP , and provides
(E,P, aP, bP ) to A.
2) Eventually, A issues the challenge query x∗ ← {0, 1}∗.
3) The challenger samples b $← {0, 1} uniformly at random
and sets y0 ← PRFλ(abP, x) if b = 0, and y1 ← {0, 1}λ
otherwise. The challenger returns yb to A.
4) A may issue a single query to the oracles, EC-ODHa and
EC-ODHb, handled as follows:
• EC-ODHa(S, x): Challenger returns ⊥ if S /∈ E
or if (S, x) = (bP, x∗), otherwise it returns y ←
PRFλ(aS, x).
• EC-ODHb(T, x): Challenger returns ⊥ if T /∈ E
or if (T, x) = (aP, x∗), otherwise it returns y ←
PRFλ(bT, x).
5) Eventually, A outputs the bit guess b, and wins the
experiment if b = b.
We define the adversarial advantage in the
EC-sym-ssPRF-ODH experiment as





and we say that the EC-sym-ssPRF-ODH assumption holds if
AdvEC-sym-ssPRF-ODHPRFλ,A (λ) ≤ negl(λ) .
APPENDIX B
ASSOCIATION BETWEEN USER COMPROMISE TYPES
We begin by presenting Theorem B.2, which will prove
useful as a framework in future proofs within the compromised
user setting.
Lemma B.1. Let X and Y be non-empty subsets of
{iu, ru, ui, ur} such that X ⊆ Y with labels x and y
respectively. If a session oracle πUj is CompUser[x]-fresh, then
it is also CompUser[y]-fresh.
Proof: Let Π be a cyborg key exchange protocol, and
let A be a PPT adversary against the CYBORG-CompUser[x]
security of Π. If some user session oracle, πUj , is CompUser[x]-
fresh then we must have that A never issued a single query that
broke CompUser[xi]-freshness simultaneously for all xi ∈ X
over the course of the CYBORG-CompUser[x] security exper-
iment by Definition III.12. This means that for every query is-
sued by A, πUj must have met the definition for CompUser[xi]-
fresh for some xi ∈ X . Since X ⊆ Y , then we also have
that πUj must have met the definition for CompUser[yi]-fresh
for some yi ∈ Y for every query issued by A. Thus, A
never issued a single query that broke CompUser[yi]-freshness
simultaneously for all yi ∈ Y and we have that πUj is also
CompUser[y]-fresh.
Theorem B.2. Let X and Y be non-empty subsets of
{iu, ru, ui, ur} such that X ⊆ Y with labels x and y
respectively, and let Π be a cyborg key exchange protocol.
If Π is not CYBORG-CompUser[x]-secure, then it is not
CYBORG-CompUser[y]-secure.
Proof: Let Π be a cyborg key exchange protocol, and let
A be a PPT adversary that breaks the CYBORG-CompUser[x]
security of Π. We then construct a second adversary, B,
against the CYBORG-CompUser[y] security experiment. The
challenger starts the experiment and forwards the protocol
flows of Π to A and uses A’s responses. By the success of
A, Lemma B.1, and Definition III.12, we have CompUser[y]
freshness and the success of B. Therefore we have that
Adv
CYBORG-CompUser[x]




SHM PASSKEY ENTRY PROOFS
We restate Theorem VI.1 and provide a proof. The proofs
of Theorem VI.2–Theorem VI.3 follow similarly; due to space
constraints these are left to the full version.
Using Theorem B.2, we advance analysis incrementally
introducing more allowable combinations of user compromise
until we reach an environment where the protocol breaks. At
such a point, all subsequent definitions of the compromised
user setting where the break persists can then be addressed as
a corollary.
A. SHM Initiator-Generated Passkey Proofs
Theorem (VI.1). SHM Initiator-Generated Passkey Entry is
CYBORG-UncUser-secure under the EC-sym-ssPRF-ODH
and EC-DDH assumptions, the sec-pre of H, and the
SUF-CMA security of HMAC.
Proof: The proof of this theorem involves a series of
game hops between an adversarial PPT algorithm A and the
challenger. We denote the adversarial advantage of a specific
game as Advi, for the i-th game hop.





where λ is the security parameter, ηp is a bound on the number
of participants, and ηs is a bound on the number of sessions
a participant can run.
Game 1: This game is equivalent to the previous except
we raise the event abort, end the experiment, and output zero
if there ever exists two session oracles that generate the same
ephemeral key, SK, in Phase 1. If session keys ever repeat,
then A could execute a StateReveal query on the second
session to recover SK and compute DHKey. We have that:





where µ is the length of SK.
Game 2: This game is equivalent to the previous except
we raise the event abort, end the experiment, and output zero
if there ever exists a nonce collision in the experiment. This
prevents trivial guesses of passkey bits and lets us assume all
nonces are generated fresh. There are 20 nonces generated in
each session, therefore, we have that:





Game 3: This game is equivalent to the previous
security experiment except we raise the event abort, end
the experiment, and output zero if a passkey is ever reused.
Since the passkey is inherently revealed during the completion
of the Passkey Entry protocol, re-use of this value would allow
A to break auth or key-ind with probability 1. Since only one
passkey is generated each session we have that:





where |r| is the length of the passkey r.
Game 4: This game is equivalent to the previous secu-
rity experiment except we guess the session oracles executing
the protocol, the test session πAs and its partner π
B
t , and abort





We then continue by case dependency on if A attempts to









a) Advantage against correct: Since session oracles
with matching session identifiers are guaranteed to accept by
the correctness of Passkey Entry, we have that:
Advcorrect4 = 0 .
b) Advantage against auth:
Game 5: We continue with Advauth4 . Since we have
the requirement that πAs remains fresh, we will abort the
experiment if A issues a StateReveal, KeyReveal, ShowUser,
or ControlUser queries such that πAs or the partnered user
session, πUj , are no longer UncUser-fresh. If π
U
j is also
partnered with πBt , we abort if A issues a StateReveal(πBt )
query while πAs 6= accept. We raise the event abort, end the
experiment, and output zero if A succeeds in replacing PKb.
In order to replace PKb, and therefore get πAs to accept
maliciously,A must guess all |r| bits of the passkey r, allowing
it to recalculate the commitment under a nonce key of its








Game 6: We replace DHKey with a uniformly random
value D̃HKey = cP for c $← Fq where Fq is the finite field
over which we define our elliptic curve E and P is a generator
for E. Suppose that the adversary can distinguish between
this and the previous game. Then we can construct a new
adversary, B1, solving the DDH problem, as from the previous
game hop we have that Diffie-Hellman shares aP = PKa, and
bP = PKb have been exchanged.
The challenger proceeds as before, but replaces the DHKey
with a uniformly random value D̃HKey = cP , which
is used for both partners. Algorithm B1 receives as input
(E,P, aP, bP, cP ) where aP = PKa, bP = PKb, and






We continue the proof by separating two sub-cases based






Case 1: πAs .role = initiator.
Game 7: This game is equivalent to the previous
security experiment except we raise the event abort, end
the experiment, and output zero if the adversary succeeds in
forging the tag Eb or any of Nb, IOcapB, or B in the message
used to compute Eb.
We bound the abort condition by constructing the ad-
versary, B2, against the SUF-CMA security of HMAC.
The challenger sets the MAC key to D̃HKey, and
B2 uses the oracle MAC to compute tags. B2 calls
MAC(Nb‖Na‖ra‖IOcapB‖IOcapA‖B‖A), which returns the
tag Eb (r, Nb,i, and Na,i are all public at this
point in the protocol). B2 then gives the message-tag
pair (Nb‖Na‖ra‖IOcapB‖IOcapA‖B‖A,Eb) to A. If A
is able to forge a new tag, call it Ewin, such that
MAC.Vfy(Nb‖Na‖ra‖IOcapB‖IOcapA‖B‖A,Ewin) = 1, or
a new message, call it msgwin, by forging at least one of Nb,
IOcapB, and B, such that MAC.Vfy(msgwin, Eb) = 1, then B2
can win the SUF-CMA experiment with the winning message-






Game 8: This game is equivalent to the previous
security experiment except we raise the event abort, end
the experiment, and output zero if the adversary succeeds in
forging any of B’s nonces or B’s role, causing A to accept
maliciously.
From Game 7 we have that A does not succeed in forging
Nb. Thus if A succeeds in forging any nonce Nb,i or B’s role,
we use the success of A to construct a new adversary, B3,
against the second-preimage resistance of the hash function.
Per the sec-pre experiment, B3 is given the message-hash pair
(Nb,1‖ . . . ‖Nb,20‖roleb, Nb) by A (note that all Nb,i nonces
are public at this point in the protocol), where the nonces are as
sampled by πBt and Nb = H(Nb,1‖ . . . ‖Nb,20‖roleb). By our
abort condition, A is able to forge at least one nonce N ′b,i
or B’s role. B3 uses the new sequence N ′b,1‖ . . . ‖N ′b,20‖role
′
b
as its guess at a second-preimage for Nb. By the success of A
we have that H(N ′b,1‖ . . . ‖N ′b,20‖role
′






By Game 8, the adversary can only succeed in breaking
auth by forging a commitment value, Ca,i or Cb,i. However,
the correctness of HMAC ensures Ca,i or Cb,i against forgery
for all i since the messages and keys used to compute them are
fixed from previous game hops. We therefore have matching
sidu, πAs .pid = B, π
B
t .pid = A, π
A
s .role 6= πBt .role telling us
our session oracles are partnered via Definition III.4. Thus,
Advauth,C18 = 0 .
Case 2: πAs .role = responder. This case follows
similarly to Case 1.
Combining our previous probability statements for the two




2 · (AdvSUF-CMAHMAC,B2(λ) + Adv
sec-pre
H,B3 (λ)) .
c) Advantage against key-ind: In this case we assume
that
Game 5: We now bound Advkey-ind4 . Since we have
the requirement that πAs remains fresh, we will abort the
experiment if A issues a StateReveal, KeyReveal, ShowUser,
or ControlUser queries such that πAs or the partnered user
session, πUj , are no longer UncUser-fresh. If π
U
j is also
partnered with πBt , we abort if A issues a StateReveal(πBt )
query while πAs 6= accept.
Suppose that A can correctly distinguish the provided key
as real or random. Then we can construct a new adversary,
B4, solving the EC-sym-ssPRF-ODH problem as follows. B4
17
receives as input (E,P, aP, bP ) where P is a generator of
our elliptic curve group, aP = PKa, and bP = PKb. B4
then issues the challenge query x = (Na‖Nb‖btlk‖A‖B)
(if πAs .role = initiator and x = (Nb‖Na‖btlk‖B‖A) oth-
erwise) also using values as chosen by our test and part-
ner oracles. The challenger then randomly samples b and
sets LK ← HMAC(DHKey, Na‖Nb‖btlk‖A‖B) if b = 1
and LK $← {0, 1}λ otherwise. The challenger then returns
LKb to B4. The challenger also allots one-time access to
the left and right HMAC oracles for computation of Ea
and Eb. At this point, B4 can simulate all other flows be-
tween our test session and partner session. If we have that
LKb = HMAC(DHKey, Na‖Nb‖btlk‖A‖B), then the view
of A when interacting with this game is identical to Game 4.
Similarly, the view of A when interacting with this game is
identical to Game 5 if LKb
$← {0, 1}λ. Thus by the success of
A in distinguishing Game 4 and Game 5, we have the success






Since the session key of our test oracle is now uniformly
random, we also conclude: Advkey-ind5 = 0 .
We now combine all probability statements to arrive at our
final security reduction:


















Per the Passkey Entry specification, |r| = 20.
Theorem (VI.1). SHM Initiator-Generated Passkey Entry is
CYBORG-CompUser[x]-secure for
x ∈ {[ru], [ui] [ru, ui]} .
Proof: This proof follows from a triviality. In all three
of the above listed CYBORG-CompUser[x] security environ-
ments, the adversary gains the capability to issue queries
that allow him to compromise a UtD channel(s) that is/are
not employed in Initiator-Generated Passkey Entry. Therefore,
these settings reduce to the CYBORG-UncUser setting, which
was proven secure in Theorem VI.1.
Lemma C.1. SHM Initiator-Generated Passkey Entry is not
CYBORG-CompUser[iu]-secure.
Proof: We proceed via counter-example. Let A be an
adversarial algorithm against the CYBORG-CompUser[iu]
security of the Initiator-Generated Passkey Entry protocol.
A first issues a SendDevice(πAs , (start, B)) query and a




t ))) query to initiate protocol par-
ticipants. A then issues a ShowUser(πAs ) query and proceeds
with a MitM attack as follows:
• Phase 0 proceeds as normal.
• In Phase 1: A impersonates πAs to πBt .
• In Phase 2:
◦ A generates the passkey and sends it to the user.
◦ Since A issued a ShowUser(πAs ) query, he may modify
the value r shown to the user. We denote this new
passkey re.
◦ The user forwards re to πBt per the protocol specifica-
tion.
• Phase 3 and 4 proceed according to the protocol, with A
impersonating πAs .
• πBt sets πBt .δ = accept.
At the conclusion of the above attack we have that A is
PPT algorithm winning the CYBORG-CompUser[iu] security
experiment by breaking auth.
Lemma C.2. SHM Initiator-Generated Passkey Entry is not
CYBORG-CompUser[ur]-secure.
Proof: This proof runs similarly to the one described
in Lemma C.1 with a few changes. Instead of issuing a
ShowUser(πAs ) query, A issues a ControlUser(πUj , B) query.
This allows him to modify the passkey of r to re on input to
πBt .
Theorem (VI.1). SHM Initiator-Generated Passkey Entry is not
CYBORG-CompUser[x]-secure for
[x] ∈{[iu], [ur], [iu, ru], [iu, ui], [iu, ur], [ru, ur], [ui, ur],
[iu, ru, ui], [iu, ru, ur], [iu, ui, ur], [ru, ui, ur],
[iu, ru, ui, ur]} .
Proof: By Lemmas C.1 and C.2 we have that Initiator-
Generated Passkey Entry is not CYBORG-CompUser[x] for
x ∈ {[iu], [ur]}. Therefore, we have that Initiator-Generated
Passkey Entry is not CYBORG-CompUser[x] secure for X ⊆
{iu, ru, ui, ur} where at least one of iu or ur is an element
of X , by applying Theorem B.2.
B. SHM Dual Passkey Entry Analysis
Theorem (VI.4). SHM Dual Passkey Entry is CYBORG-
CompUser[iu,ru,ui,ur]-secure under the EC-sym-ssPRF-ODH
and EC-DDH assumptions, the sec-pre of H, and the
SUF-CMA security of HMAC.
Proof: The proof of Theorem VI.4 closely follows to that
of Theorem VI.1 but with the following alteration:
Advantage against auth.
Game 5. In this game we abort if A succeeds in forging the
DH public key PKb. A may issue either a ShowUser(πBt ) or
ControlUser(πUj , B) query to forge rb, so we cannot rely on
its authenticity. However, A is unable to use a query to forge
ra and cannot learn its value due to our definition of the UtD
channel. To forge the device B’s public key then, A must guess
all 20 bits of the passkey ra to replace PKb with a chosen
PKe. Accounting for πAs in either the initiator or responder
role, we have Advauth5 ≥ Adv
auth
4 − 2-(|r|−1).
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